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Abstract  
A deficit in spontaneous or self-generated play, particularly in what is conceived as 
‘symbolic’ or representational play, has been identified as core deficit of young children with 
autism. Most empirical research on the behavior of children with autism has relied on tests of 
their cognitive development as individual thinkers who must learn to recognize conventional 
meanings. This leads to the special attention given to ‘symbolic’ play, while socio-emotional 
or relational functions of play are left unattended. 
In contrast, developmental research with typically developing children brings abundant 
evidence that inter-personal relatedness depends on mutual awareness of intentions with 
feelings between the child and other persons, with shared joy in purposeful movement, and 
that affectionate sharing is an essential element of play from birth prior to the capacity for 
meta-representation of experiences. In early infancy an emotional ‘primary intersubjectivity’ 
regulates playful ‘proto-conversations’ with voice and gesture, before sharing of imaginative 
actions in games and tasks, which is a prerequisite for later development of the cognitive 
abilities of language and story-telling that specify arbitrary meanings.   
Taking in mind the evidence on the shared enjoyment of play by typically developing 
children, and its contribution to the invention of shared meanings, we explore comparable 
studies with children with autism to bring new light to our understanding of what is atypical 
in the developmental pathway that might lead to problems with interpersonal awareness, 
intimate relationships, and with mastery of representational skills.   
Keywords: autism, play, symbolic play, intersubjectivity 
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Introduction  
Among the many studies of the play of the children with autism, most attention has 
been given to ‘symbolic’ play, because this play with conventional meanings is conceived 
as a prerequisite for communication of ideas and rational thought.  Research with children 
with autism based on this assumption claims to show that problems with a capacity to 
identify ideas and experiences with semantic or metaphorical substitutes, may influence 
negatively both intellectual development and mastery of language, and may be taken as the 
primary cause of autism, which, by these criteria, is diagnosed after infancy.   
On the other hand, evidence from studies into the social origins of play and the 
relationship between imaginative ‘symbolic’ play and the expression of affective disorder in 
autism promises to enlighten our understanding about the psychological nature and early 
development of autism (Trevarthen, Aitken, Papoudi and Robarts, 1998), because “it 
appears likely that autism results from disorders of imaginative and sociable playfulness 
itself, for which the motives and emotions are apparent from birth (Trevarthen and 
Delafield-Butt, 2013, p. 3). 
I propose in this paper that research on the development of play in typically 
developing children supports an alternative ‘intersubjective deficit’ hypothesis for 
explaining the impairment in the play of children with autism, a view that is closer to the 
original perception of the disorder by Leo Kanner (1943), who described the condition as 
“autistic disturbances of affective contact”, which are primarily emotional. Recent evidence 
supporting Kanner’s sensitive clinical work is reviewed by Hobson and Hobson (2011) and 
by Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt (2013), who emphasize the central role of affective 
engagement and affective sharing with people from birth, which raise questions concerning 
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disorders of prenatal development for emotional regulation of intersubjectivity in the 
pathogenesis of autism.  
A critical review of the literature on play in autism leaves us with many unresolved 
problems.  There is an attempt to analyse and explain these issues by bringing forward 
evidence from the development of play in typically developing children.  The examination 
of autism within a framework of typical development is important from a theoretical point 
of view, to test concepts of the developmental process itself (Sigman, 1989), and it is 
essential for any attempt to identify the developmental psychopathology pathway in autism 
(Cicchetti, 1990).   
The Development of Play in Typically Developing Children 
Several definitions of children’s play have been offered and there are many 
theories concerning the role of play in human development.  However, “. . . the widely 
shared notion that the entity ‘play’ is a behavioural disposition that occurs in describable 
and reproduceable contexts and is manifest in a variety of observable behaviours.”  -- 
(Rubin, Fein and Vandenberg, 1983, p. 698) can be accepted as a basis for research 
analysing play as an adaptive behaviour.  Although theories of play have been constructed 
within historical, evolutionary, psychoanalytic, anthropological, cognitive, animal, 
linguistic, communicative or philosophical frameworks (Sutton-Smith and Kelly-Byrne, 
1984), here only the cognitive and communication theories of play will be discussed, 
because they: a) relate directly to the debate about the cognitive or affective nature of 
human play, and b) they provide a framework for re-interpreting the empirical studies of 
play in autism that have only focused on the cognitive aspects of play.   
In the literature, children’s play is found to be linked with the acquisition of 
language and symbolic representation (Piaget, 1962), language and thinking (Vygotsky, 
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1966), or wider cooperative understanding in ‘companionship’ (Trevarthen, 1979a, 1979b, 
2001).  It has also been considered essential in the development of tool use and problem 
solving (Bruner, 1972), social interaction (Garvey, 1974, 1977), meta-communication and 
social construction (Bateson, 1972), as well as the ‘theory of mind’ (Baron-Cohen, 1987; 
Leslie, 1987).  ‘Symbolic’, ‘imaginative’, ‘fantasy’, ‘pretend’ or ‘make-believe’ play 
develops in childhood during the second year associated with the development of language, 
and generally with the emergence of representational thought (Piaget, 1962; Vygotsky, 
1966), and this link between fantasy play and language also exists in the development of 
children with autism (McHale, Simmeonsson, Marcus and Olley, 1980; Riguet, Taylor, 
Benaroya, and Klein, 1981; Ungerer and Sigman, 1981; Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer and 
Sherman, 1987).   
For Piaget (1962) play is a symbolic system that provides the child with a means of 
assimilation needed in order to rethink past experience, and it is a reflection or product of 
egocentric thought.  According to Piaget ‘symbolic’ play originates from experimenting 
with individual thought in action, and it can only be shared with others several years after it 
is mastered by the infant for their own satisfaction.  Play is thus taken to progress from 
‘activity’ to ‘representation’, and to resulting in forms of symbolic representation.  The 
developmental process is a transition that takes the child from the earliest form of 
sensorimotor intelligence to the operational structures that characterize mature thought 
(Athey, 1984).  Leslie (1987), a contemporary cognitive developmental theorist, following 
Premack and Woodruff (1978), proposed a ‘theory of mind’ hypothesis to explain meta-
representation or the ability to ‘pretend’, and therefore, to exhibit ‘pretend’ play.  He 
distinguishes between two kinds of representations in the child’s mind:  the primary 
representation which accounts for the child’s capacity to represent the world as it is, and the 
meta-representation which accounts for representing the world as something different from 
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what it is.  Meta-representation can explain internal or imaginative ‘pretence’; ‘I pretend the 
banana is a telephone’, or understanding ‘pretence’ in others;  ‘Mother pretends that the 
banana is a telephone’.   
Vygotsky (1978), in contrast to Piaget, emphasized the primacy of the social and 
affective role of play.  Play is, for Vygotsky, the source of development, and it is created in 
the ‘zone of proximal development’, which is the functional space between what the child 
can do, or know how to do, on his/her own and what the child can do or know with 
assistance. It is not primarily an ego-centric activity. Every psychological function, 
including play, appears “. . . first, between people (inter-psychological), and then inside the 
child (intra-psychological).”  -- (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 57).  Symbolic representation is the 
significant result of play behaviour, which is a means for creation of roles and rules, and for 
formation of symbols (Vygotsky, 1966).  Bateson (1955) also emphasized the 
communicative function of play for others.  A prerequisite for play is,  “. . . some degree of 
meta-communication, i.e., of exchanging signals which would carry the message ‘this is 
play’.”  -- (Bateson, 1955, p. 41).  The message of play is considered as a kind of paradox; 
the player indicates that one thing is so, but at the same time that it is not so.  It is supposed 
to promote ‘equilibration’ between knowledge and new reality.  The child learns the rules 
of meta-communication, and therefore implicitly the way in which reality is socially 
constructed.  In this way, the child is learning through being social, as well as imaginative 
for self-satisfaction (Sutton-Smith and Kelly-Byrne, 1984).   
Theories about children’s play have generated many empirical studies most of 
which have focused on the development of young children’s ‘symbolic’ play, taken as the 
most advanced form of play with a significant relationship to language acquisition (Lowe, 
1975; Nicolich, 1977; McCune-Nicolich, 1981; Ungerer, Zelazo, Kearsley and O’ Leary, 
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1981), but there are a few studies which have considered a broader spectrum of play 
categories, distinguishing, for example, ‘manipulative’, ‘exploratory’ and ‘functional’ play.   
Solitary or Subjective Play With Objects 
Fenson, Kagan, Kearsley and Zelazo (1976) in a cross-sectional study of 7-20 
month old children categorized play behaviours into three classes, i.e. ‘relational’, 
‘symbolic’ and ‘sequential’ acts.  At 7 months infants’ play was characterized by visual, 
oral and tactual examination of objects.  The first level of ‘relational’ play appears at 9 
months, when an infant relates or combines two objects.  Relational acts were distinguished 
into appropriate associations between objects (e.g. putting the lid on the pot), into 
inappropriate associations (e.g. touching the lid against the side of a cup), and into grouping 
objects (e.g. putting two spoons together).  Symbolic activities, in the second class, took 
place from 9 to 20 months and included eating, drinking, pouring, stirring and spooning 
from one container to another.  The last class of play, i.e. the sequential acts, from 13 to 20 
months involved performing two identical consecutive acts (e.g. putting a cup on a saucer 
and immediately afterward placing another cup on another saucer), and combining two 
different but thematically similar acts into a sequence (e.g. stirring in a cup and then in a 
pot).   
Fenson and Ramsay (1980) studied extensively the transition from self-centered or 
self-directed play acts to decentered play which is finally integrated into multiple scheme 
sequences, i.e., in Piagetian terms, the transition from ‘sensorimotor’ to ‘representational’ 
cognition.  They observed that decentered acts were prominent by 19 months, single scheme 
combinations of centered and decentered acts were exhibited by 19 months and multiple 
scheme combinations emerged by 24 months.   
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Ungerer and Sigman (1984), in an investigation of the relation of play and 
sensorimotor behaviour to language in the second year, defined five play behaviours.  The 
first behaviour, included ‘simple manipulation’ of objects (12 months) such as mouthing, 
waving, banging, fingering or throwing a single toy.  The second category, ‘relational’ play 
(12 months), involved: a) combination of objects, such as touching or banging two objects 
together in a non-functional manner, b) stacking objects and c) using one object as a 
container to hold another object.  The last two sub-categories excluded those behaviours 
which were considered functional associations of objects, e.g. placing a cup on a saucer or 
putting a spoon into a cup. The third category, ‘functional’ play (12-18 months) included 
functional or conventional associations of objects.  Four different sub-categories were 
recorded:  a) self-directed acts, e.g. brushing one’s hair, b) doll-directed acts, e.g. feeding a 
doll with a spoon, c) other-directed acts, e.g. holding a telephone receiver to the mother’s 
ear and d) object-directed acts e.g. placing the top on the teapot.  The fourth category, 
‘symbolic’ play (18-24 months) was classified into three types:  a) the use of one object as 
if it were a different object (substitution play), e.g. using a cup as a telephone receiver, b) 
use of a doll as an independent agent of action (agent play), e.g. propping a bottle in a doll’s 
arms as if it could feed itself, and c) creation of objects or people having no physical 
representation in the immediate environment (imaginary play), e.g. making pouring sounds 
as imaginary tea is poured from a teapot into a cup.  ‘Sequences’ (18-24 months) was the 
last category and it was recorded to measure meaningful integrated sequences of functional 
and symbolic acts in play.  Vondra and Belsky (1989) used the additional category of 
‘transitional’ play, which is characteristic of 8-9 month old children and signifies the 
transition from ‘functional’ to ‘symbolic’ play.   
Intersubjective Play, With Others 
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Play has been associated with the acquisition of language, and if one takes 
Halliday’s (1979) account of learning language as learning how to ‘mean’ through a social 
learning of experiences, then the framework of a theory of interaction between the child and 
other people must be accepted. In this view, the child does not merely acquire knowledge 
about what words refer to, but gains understanding of the meanings or interests of the 
others’ intentional acts, which can be communicated by both verbal and non-verbal means.  
Furthermore, play is a productive element of this social interaction.  Smith (1977) expresses 
this view as follows:   
“Social play is one form of social interaction.  Social interaction implies that 
two or more participants are making appropriate responses to each other so 
that the sequence of interactions is continued - they are making alternating 
and contingent responses to their partner or partners.  Play is generally taken 
to imply a sequence of behaviours which shows marked combinatorial 
flexibility. . . If these characteristics are accepted, then social play must have 
the characteristics of both social interaction and play.”  -- (Smith, 1977, p. 
123).   
Social play has been studied in the playful interactions of children with their 
mothers or with their peers.  The value of skilled participants, who can be either caregivers 
or peers, in interactions with children has been described by Rogoff (1990) using the 
concept of ‘guided participation’, which involves “. . . children and their caregivers and 
companions in the collaborative processes. . . . Underlying the process of guided 
participation is intersubjectivity:  a sharing of focus and purpose between children and their 
more skilled partners . . . ”  -- (Rogoff, 1990, p. 8).   
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Parten (1932) was the first to classify children’s social play with peers.  She 
distinguished play into social categories such as ‘solitary’ play, ‘unoccupied’, ‘onlooker’, 
‘parallel’ and ‘associative’ play.  In ‘solitary’ the child plays alone and independently with 
whatever toys are of interest.  When ‘unoccupied’, the child does not appear to be engaged 
with anything specific and his behaviour seems aimless.  As ‘onlooker’ the child watches 
the play but does not enter into the play, while in ‘parallel’ play the child plays 
independently and beside rather than with other children.  In ‘associative’ play the child 
plays with other children but their play is not organized and during ‘cooperative’ play the 
child plays in a group with activities organized for some purpose.  Garvey (1974) described 
the dyadic play of peers as ‘nonsocial’ when one or both peers engage independently in an 
imaginative activity, and as ‘social’ or ‘ritual’ when both children are mutually engaged in, 
for example, a housekeeping activity.   
Others have suggested that negotiations (Göncü, 1987), intersubjectivity 
(Trevarthen, 1989; Göncü, 1992, 1993) and establishment of shared objects (Werner and 
Kaplan, 1963) or a shared world (Giffin, 1984; Nelson and Seidman, 1984) are elementary 
foundational features in children’s acquisition of play and ‘pretend’ play.  Trevarthen 
(1979a) who first used the term ‘primary intersubjectivity’ to describe the interactions 
between mothers and young infants, argues that interpersonal communication is 
characterized by transmission and feedback of emotional information and sharing of 
purposeful control.  Infants can share mental control with other people if they have two 
skills:  a) subjectivity, wherein they exhibit to others the rudiments of individual 
consciousness and intentionality, with ‘affective appraisal’, and b) intersubjectivity, by 
means of which they are able to adapt or fit this subjective control to the subjectivity of 
others by sharing expressions of vitality and emotions, as described by Daniel Stern 
(1985/2000, 2010).   
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In a dyadic proto-conversational exchange (Bateson, 1979), infants adapt to 
expressions of the mother and the mother generates expressions adapted to her infant’s 
changing interest.  Infant expressions, infant responses, maternal expression and maternal 
responses are the four main functions which regulate a dyadic intersubjective 
communication.  There is a transition from person-to-person interaction in ‘primary 
intersubjectivity’, to person-object-person interaction in play, to ‘secondary 
intersubjectivity’ near the end of the first year when infants begin to take up the special 
purpose of the other persons actions.  Infants of 3-8 months old show exploratory behaviour 
with objects and later, when they are around their first birthday, act cooperatively with their 
mothers or other companions in a joint task (Trevarthen, 1979b, 2001).   
Göncü (1993) argues that intersubjectivity in ‘pretend’ play develops 
simultaneously but in three different planes.  First, social ‘pretend’ play is affective and 
children engage in play to share emotional significant experiences with others.  Second, 
social ‘pretend’ play is meta-communicative and children negotiate to reach an agreement 
that identifies the activity as ‘pretend’ play.  Third, social ‘pretend’ play is communicative 
in which children use non-verbal exchanges, verbal exchanges and actions to construct with 
others ‘pretend’ play.  Howes, Unger and Matheson (1992) describe three functions of 
social ‘pretend’ play with a varying degree of importance depending on the child’s 
developmental stage.  The first function of social ‘pretend’ play is mastery of 
communication of meaning which plays a central role in the toddler period.  The expression 
and exploration of control and compromise is an important function in the early preschool 
period and mastery of intimacy and trust is the major function of social ‘pretend’ play in 
older children.  This collaborative play is driven by imitation of actions to make enjoyment 
of displays in groups of children too young to learn language, and Jacqueline Nadel has 
shown how this mutual imitation with peers ‘boosts development’, and how the principles 
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of its motivation and negotiation may be applied to benefit children with autism, drawing 
them into cooperation and facilitating their use of language (Nadel, 2014). 
Empirical studies have been carried out to investigate the mothers’ role in play 
with young children.  Dunn and Wooding (1977) observed the play of 24 children between 
18 and 24 months when their mothers were doing some housework or were relaxing.  They 
defined two levels of maternal involvement:  ‘joint attention’ to indicate that the mother 
was looking at the child’s play and commenting on it, and ‘joint play’ when the mother 
actively took part in the child’s activity.  They found that ‘pretend’ play took place when the 
children were in joint attention with their mothers or were seeking their mothers’ attention, 
and that the mothers’ initiations were mainly focused on ‘pretend’ play activities.  Haight 
and Miller (1992) carried out longitudinal observations of everyday pretending with 12 to 
48 months old children in middle-class American families and they found that at 12 months 
any child pretending was initiated by their mothers.  By 24 months ‘pretend’ play was fully 
and jointly established, where ‘pretend’ episodes in pretend play with the mother were 
longer than solitary episodes and mothers remained the primary play partners until the 
children were 36 months.  Similarly, Zukow (1986) and Fiese (1990) found that children’s 
performance during interactive play sequences with their caregivers in the second year was 
significantly more advanced than non-interactive sequences.   
At the same period of development, children and mothers are playing at parallel 
levels and change in one partner’s ‘symbolic’ play is associated with changes in the other 
partner’s play (Tamis-LeMonda and Bornstein, 1991).  The fact that reciprocity and turn-
taking can lead to ‘symbolic’ play confirms the intersubjective basis of this complex level 
of play.  In contrast, simpler forms of play, such as ‘manipulative’ play, are more dependent 
on maternal direction and instruction (Fiese, 1990).   
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At 2 years children could enact mothering behaviours to a doll with the help of 
their mothers, as well on their own.  Six months later, children showed more elaborate 
mothering behaviours independently and their mothers tended to observe their play and 
suggested more elaborate activities (Miller and Garvey, 1984).  O’ Connell and Bretherton 
(1984) found that the play of 20- and 28-month olds was generally more diverse in 
collaborative sessions with the mother than when the children played alone.  Also, 20-
month olds showed an increase in exploratory and combinatorial play, while 28-month olds 
showed an increase only in ‘symbolic’ play during play with their mothers.  The mothers of 
the 20-month and 28-month olds gave the same amount of suggestions for ‘symbolic’ play, 
but only the 28-month old children readily accepted their mothers’ suggestions (O’ Connell 
and Bretherton, 1984).  Similarly, Slade (1987) investigated the effects of maternal 
involvement on ‘symbolic’ play during the period from 20 to 28 months of age.  Maternal 
involvement was distinguished into three categories:  ‘no involvement’ in child’s play, 
‘commentary’ when the mother uses affirmative or elaborative comments and ‘interaction’ 
when the mother is actively involved in play or suggests ‘pretend’ activities.  She found that 
‘interaction’ was associated with lengthier and higher-levels of ‘symbolic’ play than the 
category ‘commentary’;  ‘commentary’ was also associated with lengthier and higher levels 
of ‘symbolic’ play than ‘no involvement’.   
Overall, these results from studies of natural collaboration in play through the 
period when language learning is just beginning support Vygotsky’s (1978) and Bateson’s 
(1955) claim that children gain cultural knowledge through social interaction and Rogoff’s 
(1990) description of learning as occurring by means of ‘guided participation’.  They carry 
important implications for how development of motives for communication in children with 
autism may be supported, in enjoyment of play. 
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The Fault in Development of Play in Autism: Is It More Than Lack of Symbolic 
Intelligence? 
The play of children with autism has been recognised as limited by fascination 
with the immediate presentation of objects to the senses rather than their possible, imagined 
meanings or representational uses (Eisenberg and Kanner, 1956), leading to excessively 
repetitive activities (Kanner, 1943; Eisenberg and Kanner, 1956; Tilton and Ottinger, 1964; 
DeMyer, Mann, Tilton and Loew, 1967; Black, Freeman and Montgomery, 1975; Rutter, 
1978; DSM-III-R, 1987, DSM-IV, 1994; DSM-V, 2015).   
Researchers in the area of autism studies have been interested in ‘symbolic’ play 
because this relates to the importance it is presumed to have for the acquisition of language 
(Piaget, 1962; Vygotsky, 1966; Bruner, 1972) and for the development of representations of 
all kinds (Leslie, 1987), and thus for understanding of how cultural conventions are learned 
in communication (Mead, 1934; Bateson, 1972; Trevarthen, 1979a, 1979b).  This range of 
estimates of the importance of an acquired ‘symbolic’ imagination for cooperative 
intelligence in human society has given rise to many concepts of the ‘symbol’, which may be 
defined more: 1) as product of an adaptation of the mental processes in one individual for 
their own interest and pleasure, because: a) a symbol is “. . . something that stands for, 
represents, or denotes something else, not by exact resemblance, but by vague suggestion or 
by some accidental or conventional relation.”  -- (Ricks and Wing, 1975, p. 192), or b) a 
symbol is “. . . a representation of a representation, or is a ‘second-order’ representation.”  -- 
(Baron-Cohen, 1987, p. 146), and 2) as a product of communication and cooperation 
promoted within interpersonal engagements with shared emotional evaluations from the start 
because: a) symbols are “. . . experiences and actions with interest and usefulness given to 
them by the motives for cooperative awareness.”  -- (Trevarthen and Logotheti, 1987, p. 61) 
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or b) “symbols direct and organize, record and communicate.”  -- (Ogden and Richards, 
1923/1985; cited in Hobson, 1993, p. 131).   
Early studies in autism looked more for clear deficits of the performance of play as 
restricted by repetitive activities, but recent studies are more influenced by theories of the 
cognitive representations of play in typical development. With the cognitive interpretation 
of the motives or function of playful behavior, estimating that conventional representations, 
as in language, is the highest level, it has been presumed that the less imaginative 
‘sensorimotor’ and ‘combinatorial’ play of children with autism is unimpaired (Riguet et 
al., 1981; Ungerer and Sigman, 1981; Doherty and Rosenfeld, 1984; Sigman and Ungerer, 
1984; Wetherby and Prutting, 1984; Baron-Cohen, 1987; Lewis and Boucher, 1988; Stone 
et al, 1990).  The ‘functional’ play of children with autism, using objects as tools, has also 
been reported to be unimpaired, in both observational studies of spontaneous behaviour 
(Ungerer and Sigman, 1981; Doherty and Rosenfeld, 1984; Baron-Cohen, 1987) and tests 
of elicited responses (Lewis and Boucher, 1988).  On the other hand, some studies have 
reported that the amount of ‘functional’ play children with autism show is both less diverse 
and less elaborated than in control groups during spontaneous or free play sessions (Sigman 
and Ungerer, 1984; Lewis and Boucher, 1988; Stone et al, 1990; Williams, Reddy and 
Costall, 2001).   
It is a common belief that the ‘symbolic’ play of children with autism is poor or 
absent (Wing, Gould, Yeates, and Brierly, 1977; Rutter, 1978; Ungerer and Sigman, 1981; 
Doherty and Rosenfeld, 1984; Wetherby and Prutting, 1984; Wulff, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 
1987; DSM-III-R, 1987; DSM-IV, 1994). The findings claimed for the ‘symbolic’ play of 
children with autism are varied and in some cases are contradictory.  A deficit in ‘symbolic’ 
play in free and unguided situations has been claimed (Sigman and Ungerer, 1984; Baron-
Cohen, 1987; Lewis and Boucher, 1988), but others find that it is unimpaired in such 
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situations (Stone et al, 1990).  Furthermore, while it has been reported that children with 
autism typically lack ‘symbolic’ play in structured, elicited or modeled tests (Riguet et al, 
1981; Sigman and Ungerer, 1984; Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer and Sherman, 1986), other 
investigators find that relatively able children with autism do show symbolic pretense when 
tested in this way (Lewis and Boucher, 1988).   
Different Situations for Testing Play of Children With Autism 
Researchers have been particularly interested in looking for a deficit in the 
‘symbolic’ play of children with autism because it has been presumed to be typical of their 
behavior, and indicative of a special, and human, cognitive deficit.  The settings for data 
collection and the explanation of ‘symbolic’ play deficit have been designed according to 
hypotheses originating in theories of the development of human intelligence and cognitive 
processes for learning verbal communication.  A variety of situations that differ in their 
demands for cooperation have been used.   
Wing and Gould (1978) analysed parents’ and teachers’ interviews about the 
children’s play, and also made observations of the children playing at school or at home.  
Three studies have observed the spontaneous play of children with autism (Baron-Cohen, 
1987; Mundy et al, 1987; Stone et al, 1990), and one study included appropriate comparison 
groups (Baron-Cohen, 1987).   
In a study by Riguet et al (1981) a sequence of five experimental conditions was 
used:  a free play session, a structured situation, a session involving modeling, a second 
structured session including different toys and a final free play period.  Lewis and Boucher 
(1988) observed the solitary spontaneous play of able children with autism followed by 
elicited and instructed play.  In the elicited situation the experimenter said, for example, to 
the child ‘Show me what you can do with these’, and in the instructed session the child was 
17 
told ‘Make the car go to the garage’.  This method of testing the imagination of the child 
has been criticized by Baron-Cohen, as allowing an alternative explanation, “such that 
sensible guessing will lead to behaviour strongly resembling pretence.”  -- (Baron-Cohen, 
1990, p. 207).   
Other studies have combined unstructured and structured situations (Ungerer and 
Sigman, 1981; Sigman and Ungerer, 1984; Wetherby and Prutting, 1984; Mundy et al, 
1986).  The purpose of the unstructured session in these studies was to observe the 
spontaneous, inventions in play of children with autism.  However, the experimenter first 
modeled four different symbolic acts, following which the child was permitted to play 
alone, after which a second structured setting was used to observe the children’s use of 
objects in one-to-one interaction with the experimenter.  In cases where the child did not 
use the objects functionally, the experimenter directed the child in the functional use by 
verbal cueing, and if there was still no response modeled acts were presented. 
Most of the above studies observed directly the play of children with autism.  
Other studies tested the deficits in ‘symbolic’ intelligence by employing specified tasks to 
measure the ability for comprehension of ‘pretence’ (Jarrold, Boucher and Smith, 1994), or 
they tested the ‘executive function’ (Jarrold, Smith, Boucher and Harris, 1994) in children 
with autism.  But if play is by nature flexible, spontaneous and also interactive, it cannot be 
assessed by measures limited to performance on specific tests of predefined capacities of 
individual subjects in set tasks.   
Different Theories of How Children With Autism Think, Imagine, or Relate 
Ricks and Wing (1975) were the first to claim that children with autism are 
impaired in the formation and manipulation of symbols, and to propose a ‘symbol deficit’ 
theory to explain their problems in ‘thinking’.  Later, Baron-Cohen (1987) proposed a 
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‘cognitive symbol deficit’ theory derived from his study of the development of pretend play 
in children with autism and inspired by the ‘theory of mind’, which posits a capacity to 
represent states of mind of the self or of others. He argued that ‘pretend’ play, with 
symbols, is developed on the basis of second-order representations, which children with 
autism lack, and he concluded that this is evidence that the children with autism do not have 
the capacity to produce symbols. Children with autism can have first-order representations 
which refer to the real states in the world which may be used in immediate response, e.g. ‘a 
banana is something to eat’, but they lack second-order-representations which refer to a 
representation of the first-order representation by imaginative cognition, e.g. ‘a banana is a 
telephone headset’.  
Identification of an impairment in ‘functional’ play raises problems for a symbol 
deficit theory and the meta-representation hypothesis, which claims that children with 
autism have a specific impairment in imagination for signs.  Additionally, Lillard (1993) 
argued that ‘pretend’ play does not require competence for understanding second-order 
mental representations on the basis of the evidence between the relationship of ‘pretend’ 
play to children’s supposed ‘theory of mind’. This is in disagreement with Baron-Cohen 
(1987), who claims that the ‘symbolic’ play deficits of children with autism can be 
explained entirely by a specific developmental delay in generation of second-order 
representations (Baron-Cohen, 1989). This theory fails to recognize early developments, 
which may be affected by autism, of imagination for sharing purposes without interest in 
second-order representations. Typically developing children pass tests measuring meta-
representation at the age of 4 years, but instinctive intersubjectivity for sharing imaginative 
purposes for activity by imitation is established from birth (Kugiumutzakis and Trevarthen, 
2015; Trevarthen, 1979a, 1979b; Stern 1985/2000), and intersubjective ‘symbolic’ play is 
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normally strong in familiar relationships by 24 months (Haight and Miller, 1992; Nadel, 
2014).   
Other hypotheses attempting to explain why ‘symbolic’ play is impaired in autism 
give consideration to other functions of the mind, besides perception and reason.  Lewis and 
Boucher (1988) suggested that the impaired spontaneous ‘symbolic’ play of children with 
autism could be explained as some form of conative (motivational) abnormality, possibly 
associated with the lack of pleasure that these children experience during ‘pretend’ play.  
Similarly, Harris (1989, 1993) claims that the impairment in ‘symbolic’ play is attributable 
to motivational deficits as revealed in the indifference to social contact and social appraisal 
observed in children with autism.  It has been also argued that the failure in ‘symbolic’ play 
might arise from the ‘executive function’ deficits, of action planning and reasoning, in 
children with autism (Harris, 1993) but empirical data have not supported this view 
(Jarrold, Boucher and Smith, 1994).  Hughes, Russell and Robbins (1994) have described 
executive functions as ‘mental operations which enable the individual to disengage from the 
immediate context in order to guide behaviour by reference to mental models or future 
goals’ (p. 477), which could include the generation of novel ideas or behaviours, or 
generativity (Bishop and  Norbury, 2005; Jarrold, Boucher  and  Smith, 1993; 1996). 
Furthermore, Jarrold, Boucher and Smith (1993) argued that a ‘performance’ deficit could 
explain the difficulties with ‘symbolic’ play of children with autism as opposed to a 
‘competence’ deficit (Baron-Cohen, 1987).  The argument for a ‘performance’ deficit is 
based on a study carried out by Lewis and Boucher (1988) which showed that some 
children with autism can produce ‘symbolic’ play under structured conditions, in contrast 
with Baron-Cohen (1987) who argued the ‘competence deficit’ because children with 
autism are not able to initiate ‘symbolic’ play.  There is no clear evidence that could support 
the ‘performance’ or the ‘competence’ deficit hypothesis (Jarrold et al, 1994) and the fact 
20 
that children with autism do not show the same type of play as control groups of children 
with developmental delay or of typically developing children is an indication that this is a 
feature of their experience that differentiates autism from other disabilities and, therefore, 
the ‘motivational’ or ‘performance’ deficit hypothesis cannot be supported. 
Sigman and Ungerer (1984) initially proposed a ‘cognitive-affective’ model, and 
they offered two hypotheses to explain the deficits in autism.  The first hypothesis claims 
that there are two systems involved in children’s play:  the first is reflected in the 
development of sensorimotor skills and involves the capacity to recall information, and the 
second one is reflected in the capacity to translate experiences into language and symbols 
for play.  It seems that the second imaginative system must contribute to the deficits of the 
children with autism.  The second hypothesis claims that the cognitive deficits of these 
children also result from an impaired capacity for social development.  As the two 
hypotheses are not independent Sigman and Ungerer (1984) proposed that a ‘socio-
cognitive model’ should be adopted.   
The ‘cognitive-affective’ hypothesis (Mundy et al, 1987) can be clarified only by 
one empirical study so far.  The interpretation of the findings from this study is difficult 
because results are inferred from differing testing procedures and correlation analysis has 
been used.  The Reynell Developmental Language Scales (Reynell and Huntley, 1985) was 
used to assess the understanding and production of language, the Early Social 
Communication Scales (Seibert and Hogan, 1982) assessed non-verbal communication and 
play was observed separately.  It was found that the correlation between ‘symbolic’ play 
and receptive and expressive language was highly significant, but the correlation between 
‘symbolic’ play and responding to ‘joint attention’ only approached significance.  From 
these results, Mundy et al (1987) concluded that non-verbal communication and play reflect 
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independent psychological factors associated with language acquisition in children with 
autism.   
It is suggested by others that the deficit in symbol use stems from the primary 
deficit of the child with autism to engage in social relations (Fein, Pennington, Markowitz, 
Braverman and Waterhouse, 1986), to form social-affective relations (Hobson, 1989a, 
1989b, 1990, 1991), or to participate in social interaction (Klin, 1989).  Rogers and 
Pennington (1991) propose a ‘socio-affective’ theory as an explanation of the deficits in 
symbolisation, claiming that impairments in imitation, emotion sharing and ‘theory of 
mind’ cause deficits in ‘pretend’ play in autism.  To investigate this view further, recently 
Hobson, Hobson, Cheung and Caló (2015) conducted a study and they found that 
individuals with autism showed lower level of joint engagement, lower levels of ‘symbolic’ 
play and fewer shifts in symbolic meaning compared to matched individuals with 
developmental delay. 
Furthermore, regarding the socio-affective hypotheses, there are a few studies with 
peers, but the analysis of the data has not focused on different categories of play, such as 
‘sensorimotor’, ‘relational’, ‘functional’ and ‘symbolic’, or on the level of interpersonal 
contact. These studies assessed the communicative quality of peer interaction and how this 
interactional process is influenced depending on the familiarity of the observational setting, 
on the developmental level and behaviour of the interactive partner, on the acquisition of 
basic social skills, and on the structure and amount of interaction (Howlin, 1986; Lord and 
Magill, 1989).   
It is important that children with autism, like children without autism, demonstrate 
impulses for play that requires meta-representation, e.g. in making one thing stand for 
another. It is also important to show awareness of playful pretend rather than mechanical 
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pretend play because recent research finding indicate that children with autism showed less 
playful pretence or ‘showing off’, self-conscious awareness of pretending, symbolic 
meanings given to play materials, creativity, and fun (Reddy, 2008, 2012; Hobson, Lee and 
Hobson 2009). Furthermore, relationships are crucial in human development and it has been 
found that children with autism can show ‘symbolic’ play while playing with their mothers, 
but, in absence of the shared enjoyment of play that their mothers support, their play is 
repetitive without thematic coherence and creativity (Papoudi, 1993). Children with autism 
also find it difficult to join peer play (Papoudi, 2008) and they show a lack of motivation for 
initiating communication to engage with an other child (Argyropoulou and Papoudi, 2012) 
which are considered as paramount developmental milestones. 
Conclusions 
To conclude, the existing empirical data do not offer clear evidence to support any 
of the hypotheses offered to explain the deficits in play of children with autism.  It is not 
firmly established whether both ‘functional’ and ‘symbolic’ play are selectively impaired 
and the lack of ‘symbolic’ play is attributed to impairment in an imaginative representation, 
rather than to a lack of an understanding with other persons, and of sharing knowledge of 
conventional means, leading to lack of meaning-making in social and cultural contexts. Our 
discussion about the typical developmental pathway of play has shown that the missing 
element is information from investigations of the shared social play of children with autism.  
Existing studies have analyzed solitary ‘pretend’ play, not social ‘pretend’ play. The 
representations of the child are inferred by the experimenter and there is no intention for 
sharing these representations with an actual partner (Howes and Norris, 1993).  There might 
be a potential partner at a meta-representation level, but a complete theory of ‘pretence’ and 
an autotelic theory of developing minds should explain how intersubjective awareness is 
either constructed or discovered in social ‘pretend’ play, and how ‘pretend’ play develops 
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and becomes a socially shared activity among young children (Fein and Glaubman, 1993).  
Therefore, there is a need to depart from traditional cognitively based ‘single head’ 
interpretations of representation, and to examine ‘symbolic’ play with social theories as an 
intersubjective and meta-intersubjective experience, because a child’s development of mind 
should integrate affective, sensory-motor, communicative and cognitive processes of 
attention to objects and persons (Reddy, 2008, 2012).  This proposal could be confirmed by 
future research directed towards investigations of how children with autism play in 
interaction with different partners, including caregivers, siblings and peers.   
Autism is a ‘pervasive developmental disorder’ (DSM-III-R, 1987, DSM-IV, 
1994), it is recently considered as a unique spectrum disorder (DSM-V, 2013) and therefore 
should be examined in a developmental spectrum.  Existing studies do not offer enough 
information about the developmental sequence of the play of children with autism.   
Developmental studies with typically developing children have observed play in natural 
settings, but the play of children with autism has been observed mainly in experimental and 
laboratory conditions.   
Another issue concerns the psychological nature of play and mainly that of 
‘symbolic’ play.  Research with children with autism is restricted into play categories such 
as ‘sensorimotor’, ‘relational’, ‘functional’ and ‘symbolic’ play, overlooking more 
imaginative and shared forms of play such as play with language, role-taking, games, group 
play etc.   
A last limitation of our existing knowledge regards the development of play in 
children with autism with different behavioural, linguistic and cognitive characteristics.  
There is evidence that there are differences between low- and high- functioning children 
with autism (Bartak and Rutter, 1976), including differences in their play (Ungerer and 
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Sigman, 1981).  Most of research until now has been carried out with verbally and 
cognitively able children with autism, and there is a lack of knowledge regarding the 
behaviors of minimally verbal school-aged children with autism (Tager-Flusberg and 
Kasari, 2013). 
There is also a pressing need to bridge the gap between academic research and 
school practice, and to study the play of children with autism within the schools (Kossyvaki 
and Papoudi, 2016). The development of play for children with autism should be facilitated 
in special settings and be part of an inclusive ethos in mainstream schools (Papoudi, 2008) 
building up a ‘culture of play’ (Papoudi, 2013). Play is important for learning and “all types 
of learning aiming at enriching children’s natural abilities must be ‘taken up’ by the child’s 
imagination and feelings” (Trevarthen and Panksepp, 2016, in press). 
The development of play, and mainly that of ‘symbolic’ play, in typically 
developing children, is intersubjective from the start.  This invites consideration of the 
possibility that a primary impairment in children with autism for engaging in social 
relationships with other people inhibits or restrains the development of higher-level play. 
Limitations in creative, playful pretend play among children with autism is related to their 
restricted interpersonal communication and engagement (Hobson et al, 2013). The fact that 
caregiver-mediated intervention facilitating joint engagement between caregivers and 
toddlers with autism results in gains in functional play (Kasari et al., 2010) and that teacher-
mediated intervention with a child with autism facilitating interactive play results in gains 
in joint engagement (Argyropoulou and Papoudi, 2012) reinforce the belief that 
intersubjective engagement and play are involved in mutual interplay. This is strongly 
supported by studies of imitative communication, and of its use as an aid or therapy for 
development of children with autism (Nadel, 2014).  
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Research on the development of ‘symbolic’ play in autism can improve our 
knowledge about typical development, confirming that ‘symbolic’ play has intersubjective 
origins, which clarifies the relationship between affective contact and symbolic structures.  
“It appears likely that autism results from disorders of imaginative and sociable playfulness 
itself, for which the motives and emotions are apparent from birth” (Trevarthen and 
Delafield-Butt, p. 213), and if future research reveals that the level of ‘symbolic’ play in 
children with autism is dependent on the level of intimate communication and on the 
dynamic forms of vitality, this finding would then bring strong evidence that impairment in 
intimate regulations of social development is a primary feature of autism, and would further 
support the ‘intersubjective deficit’ hypothesis. As early play stemming from intersubjective 
engagement between infants and mothers supports the programming of intellectual abilities 
and sensitivities (Trevarthen and Panksepp, 2016, in press), and as intersubjective 
awareness first appearing in infancy remains as foundation of development throughout life 
(Stern, 2000), intersubjective play can be used in educational systems and in therapeutic 
settings with children and adults.  
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